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THE BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN COMMON INTEREST
DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES
CHRISTOPHER BAUM†
Feuding with one’s neighbor is an American tradition.1
Robert Frost aptly expressed this sentiment in his famous line,
“Good fences make good neighbours.”2 People take their living
situation seriously, and they become irritated when their
neighbors interfere with their rights or invade their privacy.
Small disputes can often fester into hatred and strife. Moreover,
once the relationship between neighbors has soured, it can be
difficult or impossible to repair. These problems worsen when
neighbors live close to one another.
In common interest
developments, such as condominiums (“condos”) and cooperatives
(“co-ops”), neighbors share walls, elevators, lawns, and common
areas. These close quarters make the potential for discord
between neighbors more likely among them than among owners
of single family homes who do not share these common areas.
Like relationships between neighbors, tenants’ relationships
with their landlords can also be contentious.3 In recent years,
the condo or co-op board of directors (the “board”) has become a
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1
See, e.g., LAWRENCE D. HATFIELD, THE TRUE STORY OF THE HATFIELD AND
MCCOY FEUD (1944) (detailing the infamous dispute between two neighboring
families on the West Virginia-Kentucky border).
2
Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON 12 (1914).
3
See Scott E. Mollen, Alternate Dispute Resolution of Condominium and
Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 75, 75 (1999) (noting that the landlordtenant relationship is the most passionate relationship next to love or sex).
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surrogate for the landlord.4 The board handles noise complaints,
collects maintenance fees, and enforces a variety of other rules
and regulations. The board’s paternalistic role may create
animosity and resentment in condo or co-op residents, many of
whom are forced to comply with rules that they glossed over
when they purchased their unit.
More people are living in condos and co-ops than ever
before.5 For a variety of reasons, the demand for this type of
housing is likely to continue.6 As more people move into common
interest developments, the number of disputes and the amount of
litigation will continue to increase.7
Because litigation is expensive and time-consuming, both
common interest development boards and unit owners suffer
when parties bring their disputes to court. Alternative dispute
resolution (“ADR”) is an important solution. This Article will
examine the rise of common interest development ownership, the
increase in conflicts in common interest developments, the
disadvantages of traditional litigation, the advantages of ADR,
and the various forms of ADR in other jurisdictions.
I.

THE INCREASE IN CONDO AND CO-OP OWNERSHIP

During the last quarter century, the United States real
estate market has seen a dramatic increase in condo and co-op
ownership.8 Between 1970 and 2006, the number of common
interest developments has expanded from 10,000 communities
4
See, e.g., Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condos. Homeowners Ass’n, 941 P.2d 218,
220–21 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that a condominium board owes the same duties to a
resident as a landlord owes to a tenant).
5
See Patrick J. Rohan, Preparing Community Associations for the Twenty-First
Century: Anticipating the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 73 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 3 (1999) (discussing the tremendous growth in condo and co-op ownership in
recent years); see also Mollen, supra note 3, at 77–79 (discussing various economic
and social changes that have led to increased numbers of common interest
developments).
6
See Rohan, supra note 5, at 5–10 (detailing a variety of reasons for the
increase in condo and co-op ownership); see also Mollen, supra note 3, at 77–79.
7
Lawrence M. Grosberg, Using Mediation To Resolve Residential Co-op
Disputes: The Role of New York Law School, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 499, 504 (2002)
(“Indeed, for at least a couple of reasons, the rate of increase in conflicts is probably
much greater than the growth rate in the numbers of co-op residents.”).
8
See Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An
Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 275–76
(2007) (noting that the number of condos and co-ops has increased 227% from 1982
to 2007).
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with 701,000 housing units to 286,000 communities with 23.1
million units.9 Although the increase has occurred across the
country, it has been particularly acute in New York City.10 One
commentator predicts that in the future the rental market will
“all but disappear in every major city.”11
Both legal and social changes have caused this increase in
condo and co-op ownership. America’s aging population is one
cause.12 As people get older and their children leave home, they
often sell their large houses to avoid significant physical upkeep
Common interest developments
and mortgage payments.13
usually require less maintenance, which is often provided by the
development, and mortgage payments for common interest
developments are lower.
Moreover, the elderly become
increasingly infirm, and nursing homes and assisted living
communities are often organized as common interest
developments.14
The emergence of the two-income family has also led to an
increased demand for common interest developments.15 Leisure
time becomes scarcer when both the husband and wife work.
After a long day of work, they want to spend time with their
families, without the chores and responsibilities of a large singlefamily home. Moreover, they appreciate the amenities that most
condos and co-ops offer, such as laundry, dry cleaning, and
housekeeping services. Even without these services, people
prefer condos and co-ops because they can avoid the maintenance
and upkeep traditionally associated with single-family homes.

9
G. Stephen Elisha & Tracey S. Wiltgen, ADR Spotlight: Resolving
Condominium Disputes: Mediation Works, 10 HAW. B.J. 12, 12 (2006).
10
See Schill et al., supra note 8, at 278 (noting that New York City condo and coop ownership has increased from fifteen percent to thirty percent of owner occupied
housing); see also Shannon Behnken, High Rises, High Stakes, TAMPA TRIB., July 31,
2005, at 1 (explaining the recent increase in condominiums on Florida’s west coast);
Melinda Fulmer, The Great American Condo Glut, MSN REAL ESTATE, available at
http://www.kevintomlinson.com/article-detail.php?article_id=337 (commenting on
condominium growth throughout the United States).
11
Rohan, supra note 5, at 4.
12
Id. at 8–9.
13
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 78–79.
14
Rohan, supra note 5, at 4.
15
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 78.
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Other social concerns also explain the increase in condo and
co-op ownership. One such concern is the increased desire for
home security.16 Common interest developments are often gated
communities that have their own security personnel.17 These
developments prevent nonmembers from entering the
community. Moreover, common interest developments afford
people the opportunity to live closer to where they work.18
Suburban sprawl has increased the number of cars on the road
and increased commute times.19 Condos and co-ops located in
major metropolitan areas offer people an alternative to the hourlong commute associated with living in a single family home in
the suburbs. Furthermore, those people who are not necessarily
motivated by a shorter commute from suburbia may nonetheless
be attracted to common interest developments for their
recreational facilities.20
In addition to social factors, changes in state and federal law
have also increased the number of common interest
developments,21 notably tax rules, land-use regulations, and
zoning laws. Traditionally, a landlord’s depreciation deduction
on real property decreases every year and eventually
disappears.22 The landlord’s mortgage interest deductions also
decrease and ultimately end.23 When a building is no longer a
tax shelter, the landlord is enticed to convert the building into a
condo or a co-op.24 Tax laws also encourage renters to support
condo and co-op conversions, or to move to common interest
16

Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 79.
See Rohan, supra note 5, at 9 n.17 (noting that the elderly seek out condos
and co-ops in gated communities that provide “monitoring of visitors and night
ground patrol by association personnel”).
18
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 78.
19
See OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE URBAN SPRAWL
DEBATE 93 (2002) (suggesting that sprawl has resulted in roads that are
“overwhelmed” and “hours spent driving and stuck in traffic”).
20
See Rohan, supra note 5, at 7–8 (discussing the demand for condos and co–ops
that provide amenities such as golf courses, tennis courts, and swimming pools).
21
See Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest Developments: Reflections
on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 400 (1998)
(discussing state and federal approaches to the regulation of common interest
developments).
22
Rohan, supra note 5, at 6.
23
See id.
24
This is especially true in light of the other risks and liabilities that the
landlord may face. Landlords face a minefield of legal issues, ranging from tort
actions for failure to properly maintain the building to potential liability for injuries
caused by tenants’ pets.
17
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developments, as mortgage interest is a tax-deductible expense.25
Conversions benefit tenants by enabling them to remain in their
home while becoming an owner rather than a renter. On the
other hand, tenants generally cannot deduct residential rent.26
Land use regulations that limit the amount of development
space have also increased incentives to build condos and co-ops.
Scott Mollen, a leading condo and co-op practitioner, notes that
“as development expands, land use regulation becomes more
restrictive[,] thereby increasing the cost of property
development.”27
Condos and co-ops offer developers the
opportunity to fit more units on smaller parcels of land. The
developers can then take advantage of “cluster” housing
ordinances in local zoning codes that allow them to build high
density units, while preserving undeveloped open spaces.28
Additionally, local governments may not have the budget to
build new infrastructure, such as public roads and sewage
treatment facilities.29 Developers, consequently, turn to condos
and co-ops over single-family houses to spread maintenance costs
among the residents.30 By minimizing the amount of land per
housing unit, condos and co-ops offer developers the opportunity
to maximize profits and minimize zoning obstacles.
Major legislative changes in the 1980s dramatically
increased co-op ownership in New York City. Post World War II
rent regulations had eliminated many economic incentives to
owning rental property.31
The New York City legislature
changed these laws, streamlining the conversion process from
rental property to co-ops, which enabled many landlords to

25

26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
See id. The I.R.S. tax code does not allow a deduction for residential rental
expenses.
27
Mollen, supra note 3, at 78.
28
See Rohan, supra note 5, at 8 (citing Tom Pierce, Note, A Constitutionally
Valid Justification for the Enactment of No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating
Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 93, 144
n.72 (1997)) (cluster housing is the concept of allowing high density housing units to
preserve the surrounding open space).
29
See id. (“Faced with restrictive municipal fiscal policies, the developer has
little choice but to create a home owner association to administer the private roads
and other facilities after the builder’s departure.”).
30
See id.
31
Id. at 6–7 (noting that rent control had led to landlords neglecting to maintain
their buildings and investors becoming disinterested in building new rental housing
in New York City).
26
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convert their rental apartments into co-ops.32 Furthermore, the
New York State legislature amended the New York Banking Law
in ways that encouraged more lending to co-op purchasers.33
Along with zoning laws, these changes demonstrate how state
and local governments have facilitated the growth in common
interest developments.
Lastly, economic incentives have contributed to the rise of
common interest developments. Rental building owners are
faced with skyrocketing operating costs,34 which often compel
them to simply “cash out” of their buildings and convert them
into condos or co-ops.
In fact, these costs may dissuade
developers and real estate investors from building rental
property in the first place.
II. DISPUTES INVOLVING COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT
Owners in common interest developments generally get
along with their neighbors35 and believe that the board acts in
their best interest.36 Yet the increase in common interest
developments has led to more disputes between residents and
board members.37 In New York City, the problem was so
pronounced that a separate court was created to deal with co-op
and condo disputes.38 One study found that “nearly two-thirds of
co-op and condominium associations in New York City had filed
lawsuits [between 1993 and 1996].”39 This number does not

32
See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b)–(c) (McKinney 2010); see also
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 501 (stating that because the number of tenants required
to approve a conversion of a building from rental to co-op was reduced from fifty
percent to fifteen percent, there were many more buildings that converted).
33
See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235(8-a) (McKinney 2010); see also Grosberg, supra
note 7, at 502.
34
See Rohan, supra note 5, at 6–7 (discussing rising expenses such as fuel costs,
insurance, utilities, labor, compliance with local regulations, potential tort claims,
environmental regulations, and discrimination suits that may drive building owners
out of the rental market).
35
See Elisha & Wiltgen, supra note 9, at 14 (citing a poll that found that eightsix percent of community association members get along “well” with their neighbors
and sixty-three percent get along “very well” with their neighbors).
36
See Found. for Cmty. Ass’n Research, 2009 National Research,
http://www.cairf.org/research/survey_homeowner.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
37
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503–04.
38
Jay Romano, Your Home: Co-op Cases Are Getting Own Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1997, § 11, at 3.
39
Jay Romano, Your Home: Reducing Legal Costs in a Co-op, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1996, § 9, at 2.
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include the lawsuits that residents filed.40 In fact, the number of
common interest development disputes has risen faster than the
overall number of residents in such developments.41
Commentators have described this spike in litigation as
inevitable, given the tight quarters in common interest
developments.42 The close proximity of neighbors is often the
catalyst for what have been described as “quality of life”
disputes,43 which usually involve things such as noise, odors, pet
issues, use of common areas, and personal disputes among
tenants. Although these disputes usually involve little or no
money, they spark deep resentment and strife between the
parties.
While similar issues arise in residential rental
buildings, condo and co-op dwellers have an ownership interest
and usually react more strongly.44 People are much more
committed to “preserving the physical as well as aesthetic
desirability of their homes when they own them, as opposed to
when they rent them.”45 Accordingly, common interest owners
manifest great care and concern for their units because they have
a large emotional and financial interest.
Quality of life conflicts usually arise in one of two ways. The
first type of dispute is between neighbors and often develops
when one neighbor is doing, or not doing, something that affects
the other neighbor. Loud music or second-hand smoke can turn
an occasional irritation into an unbearable daily annoyance.
Moreover, the daily contact between neighbors in condos and coops exacerbates this disharmony.

40
See id. (quoting attorney Bruce Cholst, who describes a co-op where “one
shareholder filed no fewer than 12 lawsuits”).
41
Id.
42
See Grosberg, supra note 7.
43
See, e.g., Richard Siegler, Cooperatives and Condominiums: Alternative
Dispute Resolution, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1997, at 3 (containing a sample mediation
clause for condos and co-ops that defines a “ ‘quality of life’ issue [as] any
nonmonetary issue”).
44
See Romano, supra note 38 (“ ‘[T]here is a fundamental difference between
disputes in co-ops and those in rental buildings . . . . In co-ops, the tenants are also
the owners. And a judge can’t just apply landlord-tenant law . . . without thinking
about that difference.’ ” (quoting Marc Luxemburg, a New York attorney and
President of the Council of New York Cooperatives)).
45
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 505 (discussing the various reasons why there is a
higher number of disputes between condo and co-op owners than other neighbors
and noting the change in status from renter to homeowner as one such reason).

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 997 (2010)

914

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:907

Second, quality of life disputes arise when a condo or co-op
owner has acted, or wants to act, in a manner that violates the
development’s rules and regulations.46 Most people never read
the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“restrictions”) that
govern common interest developments.47 Conflicts often erupt
when condo or co-op owners discover that there are restrictions
on their use of their property.48 Although the types of restrictions
vary, they usually cover issues such as parking, pet ownership,
use of recreational facilities, and subleasing.49 The owner of a
unit in a common interest development has less control over his
property than the owner of a typical single family house.50 The
restrictions can seem arbitrary and paternalistic to owners who
feel that the unit is their property and that they should be
entitled to do with it as they please. Additionally, disputes can
occur because these restrictions are often dated and may not
comply with new laws—for example, anti-smoking or recycling
regulations.51 Also, ambiguously drafted rules may cause conflict
because tenants are unsure of whether certain behaviors are
prohibited.52 Condo and co-op owners who obey the rules may
also resent other owners who are not complying with the
restrictions but go unpunished.53 This may encourage some other
owners to disregard the restrictions and, thereby, create friction
with the board.

46

See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, 33 CAL.
L. REVISION COMM’N REPORTS 689, 694 (2003), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/
pub/Printed-Reports/REC-CID-ADR.pdf (stating that covenants, conditions, and
restrictions “inevitably lead[ ] to conflicts”).
47
See Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle
Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“Only after [owners] have moved in and
settled down do they discover that the development declaration contains a host of
intrusive restrictions affecting their daily lives . . . .”).
48
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 79 n.14 (citing Patrick J. Rohan, Cooperative
Housing: An Appraisal of Residential Controls and Enforcement Procedures, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1966)) (suggesting that purchasers should be warned in
advance of restrictions that may limit their rights as individual owners).
49
See generally Realtor.com, What About the CC&Rs?, http://www.realtor.com/
BASICS/condos/ccr.asp?poe=realtor (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing
covenants, conditions, and restrictions in condos).
50
See Grosberg, supra note 7.
51
See Martin Librett, Change is Good!: Updating House Rules Helps Avoid
Conflicts, COOPERATOR: CO-OP & CONDO MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, available at
http://cooperator.com/articles/307/1/Change-is-Good/Page1.html.
52
Id.
53
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 504–05.
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Aside from quality of life issues, another source of potential
conflict in common interest developments are financial disputes
involving such things as maintenance fees, common charges, and
special assessments.54 The owners and the board members may
disagree over who is responsible for certain fees and repairs.
Relatively minor monetary disputes can spiral out of control and
result in protracted litigation.55 Financial disputes may also
relate to the common interest development’s restrictions. Such
disputes occur when owners feel that they are paying either
(1) common charges for a problem that does not affect them or
that they did not cause, or (2) for problems that directly affect
them that they feel are the responsibility of the whole common
interest development, as opposed to just one individual owner.
Another source of disputes unique to co-ops is that the board
has the power to deny a unit to any potential buyer, so long as
the decision is not based on race, creed, religion, or other
constitutionally prohibited criteria.56 This exercise of the board’s
A
seemingly arbitrary powers may engender animosity.57
situation may arise where a unit owner wants to sell his co-op
quickly, but the sale is blocked by the board with little or no
explanation. A unit owner may also lose a desirable selling price
because of board refusal. Furthermore, the co-op owner may be
unable to purchase a new home because the delay or failure of
the board to approve the sale of his co-op prevents him from
closing on his new property.
Finally, conflicts between owners and the board may arise
because the board is comprised of individuals who are not
professional property managers. The board in common interest
developments is comprised of unit owners who generally lack
experience in managing property.58 One commentator noted that
board members “come from varied backgrounds and experiences,
few of which prepare them for their job: the management of a

54
See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra
note 46.
55
See, e.g., Mary Voboril, How $909 Spat Cost $100,000 in Legal Fees,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 1994, at 20 (describing how a minor dispute involving the
installation of window guards ultimately led to $100,000 in attorneys fees).
56
See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 434, 160 N.E.2d 720, 724,
190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1959).
57
See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 505.
58
See James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1998).
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complex, multimillion dollar property.”59 This lack of experience
and professional expertise may perpetuate conflicts with unit
owners because the occupants may be less willing to accept the
board member’s authority. Also, a board composed of laypeople
is more likely to make legal mistake or violate procedures set
forth in the bylaws.60 Similarly, a unit owner is more likely to
question the decision of a board member with no prior real estate
experience than the decisions of a professional owner.61
Therefore, board members’ lack of professional expertise may
contribute to conflicts in common interest developments.
III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN COMMON INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS
Litigation is often an unrealistic solution to relatively minor
disputes that can arise in condos or co-ops. When disputes erupt
between neighbors regarding noise, foul odors, or other quality of
life matters, it is usually cost prohibitive for the aggrieved party
to bring a lawsuit. Even in small claims court, the cost of filing
the lawsuit, missing time from work, and traveling to and from
the court house dissuades individuals from bringing the dispute
to court. For cases not in small claims court, a party must also
incur the cost of an attorney, an additional barrier that makes
the prospect of litigation even more daunting. For these reasons,
ADR is particularly well-suited to resolve minor issues in condos
and co-ops. Mediation in particular can help bring about just
results in a cost effective manner.
A.

Weaknesses of Litigation for Resolving Disputes in Condos
and Co-ops

There are several reasons why litigation is not the most
effective means of resolving disputes in common interest
developments. The most compelling reason is the cost of
litigation. Acknowledging the high cost of litigation, the famous
French philosopher Voltaire commented, “I was never ruined but
59

Elisha & Wiltgen, supra note 9, at 14.
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra note
46, at 693.
61
Mollen, supra note 3, at 81; see also Grosberg, supra note 7, at 506; Wayne S.
Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 303, 379 (2006) (suggesting that common interest developments may hire
professional board members to aid the board in policy decisions).
60
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twice; once when I lost a lawsuit and once when I won one.”62
Litigation can be a very expensive process, especially if a party
has to pay an attorney by the hour. Because condo and co-op
disputes do not usually involve dollar amounts that justify
residents hiring attorneys on a contingency fee basis, the cost of
litigation makes “the courts inaccessible to large sections of the
poor and middle class.”63 This is particularly true when the
source of the controversy is quality of life issues. In one
particularly egregious and infamous case, a unit owner and the
board argued over who bore the responsibility to install window
guards at a cost of $909; $100,000 in combined legal fees later,
the controversy was resolved.64 One co-op owner involved in the
dispute recognized that “[a]nything you can possibly do to avoid a
lawsuit, do it.”65 It is almost axiomatic in condo and co-op
disputes that the “cost of litigation necessary to resolve these
disputes is often disproportionate to the character of the
dispute.”66 For this reason, litigation should be the last resort for
condo and co-op residents. Unfortunately, the prospect of high
litigation expenses causes many legitimate grievances to go
unresolved. In these cases, truly wronged parties suffer solely
for want of an effective method of achieving relief.67
Neither party’s interests are served by high legal bills in a
dispute involving little or no money. Individual owners are
particularly affected by the high cost of litigation because they
have to bear the full cost themselves. In contrast, the board can
spread the cost among unit owners in the form of a special
assessment charge and, therefore, may be more aggressive in
pursuing litigation.68 It should be noted, however, that the

62
AN EDITOR’S TREASURY: A CONTINUING ANTHOLOGY OF PROSE, VERSE, AND
LITERARY CURIOSA 1032 (Herbert R. Mayes ed., 1968).
63
ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., NEGOTIATION 22 (3d ed. 2006).
64
See Voboril, supra note 55.
65
Wade Lambert, Ever Hear the One About the Lawyers and the Window Bars?,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at A1.
66
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra note
46, at 695.
67
See Nathan K. DeDino, Note, When Fences Aren’t Enough: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Disputes Between Neighbors, 18 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 887, 890–91 (2003).
68
See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra
note 46, at 695–96 (noting that the owner involved in the dispute is forced to
partially fund the board’s litigation through assessments that apply to all owners).
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“highest component of any co-op’s legal expenses is litigation.”69
Legal fees quickly mount as time passes, and both parties become
entrenched in their position. Discovery devices and motion
practice are often used as weapons to drive up the other side’s
costs to force a settlement. When the costs of appeals are added
on, it is easy to see how litigation expenses can spiral out of
control, especially when parties become irrationally entrenched
in their positions.
Another weakness of litigation is the time it takes to get a
final ruling. From pleadings through final appeals, the legal
process compares to watching paint dry: slow and tedious.
Lawsuits can take several years or even a decade from start to
finish. This problem is even more pronounced in courts that
allow interlocutory appeals, as these appeals add significant time
to the process.70 Additionally, in many jurisdictions, the judicial
system is congested and overcrowded, and cases take significant
time to be resolved.71 Court congestion is doubly problematic
because (1) it delays hearings for substantial periods of time, and
(2) when those hearings actually occur, they are often rushed to
accommodate the hundred or more other cases that judges have
on their calendars.72 Even when litigation can solve an owner’s
problems, the long wait to resolve a noise or odor dispute is far
from ideal.
Litigation also lacks flexibility in the sense that parties
cannot choose who will ultimately settle their dispute. The
parties must give over their control of the outcome to a judge or
jury. The parties do not get the luxury of choosing what judge
they want and at most get a minimal amount of say over what
jurors will serve if the case progresses to a jury trial.73 One
69
Romano, supra note 39 (quoting Bruce Cholst, a Manhattan attorney who
focuses on condominium law).
70
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995) (observing that an
interlocutory appeal “can threaten [court] proceedings with delay [and] add[ed]
costs”).
71
See generally Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil
Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 813–14 (2000) (discussing the
congestion in civil courts and analyzing obstacles to reform).
72
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 86–87.
73
See Jay Romano, Mediation an Option for Housing Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2006, § 11, at 10 (citing Daniel Weitz, Chairman of the New York City Bar
Association Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, who noted that one of the
major drawbacks to litigation is that “the parties surrender control of the outcome to
a judge or jury”).
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commentator noted that in litigation: “the judge may be fully
versed in the law but not necessarily the nuances of the field.”74
Furthermore, neither a judge in a bench trial nor a jury has any
specialized knowledge in the area under which the dispute arose.
Most judges also do not have the time to adequately familiarize
themselves with the facts of the case or the context under which
the dispute arose.75 Judges or juries cannot achieve a level of
expertise—that is available when parties appoint their own
decisionmakers—in areas such as “law, economic issues, and
practical ramifications relating to the condo-co-op context.”76 The
time and effort needed to educate a decisionmaker about the
context in which the dispute arose contributes to the cost of
litigation.77
Furthermore, the judicial system is limited in the relief that
it can provide and its ability to craft solutions that benefit both
parties. When litigation finishes, there is always a “winner” and
a “loser.”78 Even for the winner, litigation can result in a Pyrrhic
victory because of the time, cost, and an unsatisfying resolution.
Because courts are bound to follow statutes and precedents, they
may be unable to craft equitable and appropriate relief for the
parties.79 In a lawsuit, both sides must operate within the
formalistic framework of legal procedure to prove their case. The
relief afforded in litigation can also be inadequate in
circumstances where relevant, but inadmissible, evidence is not
74

Liz Lent, A Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution: Finding a Better
Solution, THE COOPERATOR: THE CO-OP & CONDO MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, available at
http://www.cooperator.com/articles/1510/1/A-Guide-to-Alternative-DisputeResolution/Page1.html.
75
See id.
76
Mollen, supra note 3, at 87. But see Romano, supra note 38 (detailing New
York’s creation of a special court to deal with condo and co-op disputes. Judith Kaye,
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, stated that “[t]he idea is to allow the
judges . . . to have a special area of law they can focus on.”).
77
See Walter D. Goldsmith, Arbitration Law: Cooperative and Condominium
Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1994, at 3.
78
See Jeffrey Krivis, Benefits of Mediation: High Success Rate, Low Cost, CORP.
COUNSELLOR, Oct. 1994, available at http://www.firstmediation.com/resources/
?p=16.
79
See 2 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE—FORMS § 11.10, at 11-26 (2010); see
also Jay Romano, Your Home: Mediation Instead of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1998, § 11, at 3 (“[T]here’s a category of cases out there that can never get righted in
a courtroom . . . . When cases like that end up in court everybody loses.” (quoting
Richard Nardi, Chairman of the New York City Bar Association Committee on
Cooperative and Condominium Law)).
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taken into account by the trier of fact.80 Conversely, limitations
in the substantive law may force a party to seek relief that is
greater in scope than actually desired.81 Some courts have called
litigation “overkill” when it develops because of a minor common
interest development dispute.82 The court normally has three
options when granting relief: (1) it can award monetary damages,
(2) grant a permanent injunction, or (3) compel a party to carry
out specific performance of its contractual duties. Yet a court can
grant specific performance or an injunction only when a party
demonstrates that monetary damages would be inadequate.83
This is often very difficult or impossible to prove.84 Therefore,
litigation usually results in solutions that are defined by either
either statutory law or common law as opposed to the needs of
the parties involved.85
Another shortfall of litigation in the condo and co-op context
is the public nature of litigation.86 Litigation allows fellow unit
owners, friends, business associates, and others to learn details
of a dispute that may be personal and potentially embarrassing.87
80
See N.Y. CITY BAR, MEDIATE (DON’T LITIGATE) YOUR CO-OP/CONDO
RESIDENTIAL DISPUTE 4, available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/Mediate%28Don%
27t%20Litigate%29_brochure.pdf (noting that mediation allows the parties to “tell
their whole story,” instead of a judge or jury who decides a case based on the
admitted evidence).
81
See DeDino, supra note 67, at 894 (discussing two cases where plaintiffs were
forced to seek remedies that were disproportionate to the problems they were facing
because those were the only remedies available); see also Press Release, N.Y. City
Bar Ass’n, Co-Op & Condo Mediation Project: A New Public Service for Resolving
Disputes
(Oct.
11,
1996),
http://www.nycbar.org/PressRoom/PressRelease/
2006_1019.htm (describing litigation in condos and co-ops as “heavy-handed”).
82
See 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE—FORMS § 43.05[5][a] (2010) (citing Kirou v.
Oceanside Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 425 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), where the
court chided the plaintiff for wasting an overburdened court’s time with the trivial
matters in a case involving dogs “disgrac[ing]” themselves in common areas); see also
Tower Forty-One Ass’n v. Levitt, 426 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
83
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357–69 (1981).
84
See, e.g., Jenny R. Turner, Preinvention Assignment Agreement Breach: A
Practical Alternative to Specific Performance or Unqualified Injunction, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 631, 642 (1998).
85
See Lent, supra note 74.
86
See MEDIATE (DON’T LITIGATE) YOUR CO-OP/CONDO RESIDENTIAL DISPUTE,
supra note 80.
87
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 89; see also ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMM. &
COMM. ON ARBITRATION, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE REOSLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE WITHOUT GOING TO COURT
2 (1996) [hereinafter HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE WITHOUT GOING TO COURT],
available at http://www.abcny.org/Publications/ADR.htm.
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The Internet makes legal papers readily accessible to anyone who
is inclined to investigate a dispute. The exposure of these
litigation details could have negative business consequences as
well. For example, parties to a business transaction often run
background checks on one another.88 These background checks
reveal any past or pending litigation, and the existence of
litigation may be interpreted as a sign of strife in the common
interest development and negatively impact its value.89
Moreover, a resident who wants to sell his co-op and move into a
new one may find the new co-op board reluctant to approve his
purchase because they view him as litigious.90 The board
members themselves may have similar problems if they are
named individually as defendants in a lawsuit.91
Furthermore, litigation in common interest developments
may reduce the value of all units by highlighting the building’s
structural or operational problems.92 Potential purchasers may
avoid a building that is embroiled in a lawsuit because they fear
the board will levy a special assessment to fund the litigation.93
Lawsuits may also draw the attention of regulatory agencies,
which can conduct inspections and force the development to
make expensive repairs. These repairs would require more
special assessments and would also necessitate construction in
the building, as well as the temporary chaos that accompanies
it.94
The publicity accompanying a dispute may also further
entrench the parties in their respective positions. The board does
not want to appear weak because it wants to discourage future
litigation. Likewise, residents may be unwilling to compromise
for fear that others will perceive them as a rabble-rouser lest
they are vindicated with a victory in court. This same mentality
may apply in a dispute between two neighbors, as both want to
save face if their dispute becomes a matter of public knowledge.

88

See Mollen, supra note 3, at 89.
Id.; see also 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 82, at § 54.05[5] (noting that the
value of condominiums with “a reputation for disputes and turmoil” is negatively
impacted).
90
See Romano, supra note 39 (quoting Bruce Cholst, a Manhattan condo and coop attorney).
91
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 90.
92
Id. at 89.
93
Id. at 89–90.
94
Id.
89
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Therefore, the public nature of litigation creates a litany of issues
that contribute to the overall shortcomings of litigation as a tool
to resolve disputes in common interest developments.
Finally, litigation in common interest developments can lead
to long lasting animosity among residents or between residents
and board members. Unlike other types of lawsuits, litigation in
condo and co-op disputes involves two parties who are going to
have to see each other on a regular basis.95 This can lead to a
hostile environment not only for the disputants but also for the
other unit owners. Litigation is a contentious process, and
attorneys do not usually consider the longterm ramifications of
the battle. The litigation process is not well suited to deal with
disputes among parties with close relationships.96 Lawyers are
trained to zealously and vigorously represent their clients in
disputes, but this mentality may permanently ruin relationships.
A person who misses work, pays for an attorney, and devotes his
free time to dealing with litigation will naturally come to resent
the other party in the case.97 The more money and time spent on
litigation, the more hostility that develops between the parties.98
The negative impact of litigation is clearly illustrated in 360
Owners Corp. v. Diacou, where, in a dispute over who was
responsible for paying $909 to install window guards, the court
awarded the board $30,000 in legal fees; the remaining $43,000
in fees was to be collected through a special assessment on the
co-op share owners.99 One can imagine how the other unit
owners felt towards the resident who sued the board upon
receiving an assessment for their share of the legal bill. One
commentator noted that “[t]o the community and individuals
involved . . . these disputes may be a festering sore that needs to
be dealt with quickly and effectively to ensure a healthily
functioning community.”100 For the foregoing reasons, litigation
is certainly not the best method to resolve disputes between
parties who will have a continued relationship after the dispute
is concluded.

95

See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 506.
See DeDino, supra note 67, at 897.
97
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 88.
98
Id.
99
See Lambert, supra note 65; see also Counsel Is Awarded $30,000 Fee in Battle
Over $900 Co-op Windows, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 23, 1994, at 21.
100
1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 82.
96
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Use of Arbitration in Condo and Co-op Disputes

ADR offers an effective substitute for litigation. One method
of ADR that a condo or co-op board should consider is arbitration.
Simply put, “[a]rbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or
more impartial persons for a final and binding decision, known as
an ‘award.’ ”101 Arbitration can be either a formal or an informal
process. Formal arbitration includes matters submitted before
the Arbitration Association of America or the Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Services (“JAMS”). These associations have well
defined guidelines and rules that govern arbitrations before
them.102 In the context of common interest developments,
informal arbitration can include disputes between neighbors that
are arbitrated by the condo or co-op board or disputes that are
submitted to community justice centers.103
Arbitration can either be binding or nonbinding on the
parties. If arbitration is binding, the parties have very limited
rights of appeal. Arbitration can be implemented in three ways:
(1) the board can modify the common interest developments rules
or bylaws to require arbitration;104 (2) the parties to a dispute can
voluntarily agree to submit their dispute to arbitration;105 or
(3) arbitration may be required in some states for condo and coop disputes. Arbitration has several benefits over litigation.
There are, however, several limitations that should also be
considered.
The chief benefit of arbitration over litigation is that it
reduces costs in a variety of ways. The cost of arbitrating
common interest disputes involving quality of life issues is
comparatively low because the cost of arbitration is relative to

101
American Arbitration Association, Arbitration, http://www.adr.org/arb_med
(last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
102
For the JAMS alternative dispute resolution rules, see JAMS Comprehensive
Arbitration Rules & Procedures, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/rules.asp (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010). The American Arbitration Association’s rules are available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
103
For a discussion of the virtues of Community Justice Centers, see DeDino,
supra note 67, at 904–05.
104
See Librett, supra note 51.
105
Romano, supra note 39.
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the amount of money in controversy.106 Even if a party refuses to
compromise, the case can still be decided at a fraction of the time
and cost.107
Another reason that costs are lower in arbitration is that
disputes are resolved quicker.108 This advantage is highlighted in
one case where an arbitration involving hundreds of millions of
dollars was resolved within six months.109 The disputes in
common interest developments are normally small and could be
decided even faster than a multimillion dollar dispute. The
arbitrator’s ability to fix a hearing schedule that cannot be
altered also helps eliminate unnecessary delays.110 This prevents
the parties from delaying the case to increase arbitration costs
and force an unfair settlement. The faster a dispute is settled,
the less money is spent on attorney fees and other litigation
related expenses. Therefore, the speed of arbitration enhances
its cost effectiveness.
Furthermore, arbitration is a cost effective alternative to
litigation because it does not have litigation’s rigid procedural
formalities. For example, arbitration is typically commenced by
a party writing a simple demand for arbitration, as opposed to
filing a complex summons and complaint.111 These less formal
procedural rules again help lower costs because they allow
attorneys to spend less time dealing with procedural hurdles and
more time focusing on substantive matters.
Allowing the
attorneys to concentrate on substance enables them to more
effectively evaluate their client’s position and possibly encourage
the parties to settle.
By streamlining these procedural aspects, arbitration is
more likely to arrive at a result based on the merits of the
dispute, as opposed to a result based on technical procedural
points. If the parties wish to apply specific procedural rules, they

106
See Jay Romano, Your Home: Intervening to Resolve Disputes, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2002, § 11, at 5.
107
See Abigail Pessen, Letter to the Editor, Choosing Mediation over
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, § 11, at 8 (noting that arbitration is very
similar to litigation, except it is cheaper and faster).
108
See Irwin Kahn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Win-Win Proposition, 28
NYSBA ONE ON ONE 1, 9 (Summer/Fall 2007).
109
Claudia H. Deutsch, Bank Buying the Building Named for It, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1994, at 4D.
110
Goldsmith, supra note 77.
111
Romano, supra note 106.
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are free to stipulate to these rules in the arbitration
agreement.112 The lack of procedural formality also reduces costs
by diminishing or eliminating the need for an attorney, especially
in relatively minor quality of life disputes.113 Therefore, a party
with less money is at less of a disadvantage in an arbitration
proceeding.114
Arbitration is also less contentious than litigation because
the formal rules of evidence do not apply, unless the parties
agree otherwise.115 Although arbitrators are typically guided by
the rules of evidence, they are allowed to consider any material
they deem proper.116 In fact, if an arbitrator refuses to admit
relevant evidence, the award may be reversed on appeal.
Therefore, arbitrators tend to admit less reliable forms of
evidence and weigh the value of the evidence accordingly.117 For
example, arbitrators routinely allow evidence in the form of
affidavits that would be inadmissible as hearsay in litigation.118
These less formal evidentiary standards allow a party to express
his feelings regarding the dispute, which would clearly not be
admissible under the normal rules of evidence applicable in
litigation.119 By allowing parties to vent their frustrations and
feelings to an arbitrator, arbitration provides a form of cathartic
relief. This may encourage settlement or, at the very least, give
the parties greater satisfaction in the outcome of the arbitration
because each party was allowed to “fully” present his side of the
dispute.

112

Mollen, supra note 3, at 92.
Siegler, supra note 43.
114
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT, supra note 87.
115
1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 8:60, at 196 (3d ed.
2005).
116
Id.
117
Id. § 8:61, at 196–97; see also ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 274 (4th
ed. 2006) (“An arbitrator is . . . more likely to get into trouble by following the rules
of evidence than by ignoring them—and far more likely to get into trouble by
excluding evidence than by admitting it.”).
118
RAU ET AL., supra note 117, at 273; see also 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 8:61,
at 196.
119
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 8:61, at 196; see also DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY
FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF ADVOCATE AND NEUTRAL 197 (2006) (“Highly
emotional disputants, especially at the outset of a case, may need time to work
through their feelings.”).
113
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Furthermore, arbitration is a cheaper alternative to
litigation because discovery in arbitration is very limited.120
Discovery is often inconsistent with the goals of arbitration
because it is frequently the most costly and prolonged element of
a trial.121 Discovery in arbitration is less burdensome because
arbitrators themselves can subpoena witnesses and documents
that are necessary to make a final determination.122 When the
arbitrator requests that a party produce evidence, the party will
usually comply because a refusal could antagonize the arbitrator
and hurt their case.123
Therefore, arbitration retains the
necessary aspects of discovery and allows an arbitrator to limit or
prevent discovery that is abusive, costly, or time consuming. The
limits on discovery in arbitration prevent an additional “layer of
complexity and ‘legalism’ ” associated with litigation.124 Once
again, this may allow a party to forego hiring an attorney in
relatively minor disputes, thereby further reducing the party’s
overall costs.
Privacy is arbitration’s other major advantage over
litigation. In many instances the parties’ motivation for choosing
arbitration is the privacy that it affords.125 In arbitration,
neither the public nor the media are allowed to attend hearings
or view the records.126 Moreover, there are usually no published
opinions of the arbitrator’s final determination.127 Arbitration
may, therefore, avoid costly damage to the parties’ reputations.128
The parties’ business reputations are spared because they avoid

120
See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Arbitration Discovery, NAT’L L.J.,
Sept. 8, 2003, at 24.
121
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 8:20, at 184; see also RAU ET AL., supra note 117,
at 280.
122
See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 7, 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1999), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29567&printable=true; see also 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
123
See RAU ET AL., supra note 117, at 280.
124
Id. at 282.
125
Edward J. Costello Jr., Whether and When To Use Alternative Dispute
Resolution, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK 17,
23 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK]; see
also Justin M. Goldstein & Cassandra L. Seto, Keeping Private Arbitration Private,
L.A. LAWYER, Feb. 2008, at 12.
126
Costello, supra note 125.
127
Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2006).
128
Id. at 1212.
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the stigma of litigiousness.129 Similarly, the parties’ personal
reputations are spared the embarrassment of private information
being exposed to the public.130
Private arbitrations also facilitate settlements because the
parties do not have to worry about appearing “weak” to their
neighbors. The common interest development’s board can avoid
setting negative legal precedent. This way, other neighbors
cannot rely on the arbitration result or settlement in similar
disputes. Realistically, a board may be willing to compromise in
one isolated instance but unwilling to reach a similar agreement
if it appears to be a trend in the development. The common
interest development residents, however, no longer have to worry
about seeming weak in the eyes of their neighbors. Because
arbitration allows parties to settle their disputes privately, it
gives residents an opportunity to compromise and still save
face.131
It is important to note that there is a distinction between
“privacy” and “confidentiality” in arbitration.132
Although
arbitration proceedings are not open to the public, parties to the
arbitration are not necessarily prevented from disclosing what
goes on during the course of the proceeding. Absent an express
agreement, there is no presumption of confidentiality.133
Therefore, the parties may want to enter into a confidentiality
agreement. Yet either party may still end up in court attempting
to have the arbitration award enforced or overturned.134 In this
case, one or both of the parties may make a motion to have the
court records sealed.135 Although this provides a solution to the
confidentiality problem, having the records sealed is a difficult
process, and a court may seal some documents but not others.136
129
See, e.g., Mollen, supra note 3, at 89–90 (discussing the damage to one’s
business reputation that can result from the publicity associated with litigation).
130
See id. at 90.
131
See Schmitz, supra note 127, at 1222–23.
132
Id. at 1214–21; see also Goldstein & Seto, supra note 125, at 12–14 (noting
the limits of privacy in arbitration and the potential for the results of arbitration
proceedings to become public).
133
See Anjanette H. Raymond, Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the
Use of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 479, 493–95 (2005).
134
Goldstein & Seto, supra note 125.
135
Id. at 14.
136
Id. (explaining the standard to have a record sealed, and noting that
“[s]ealing orders must be narrowly tailored”).
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Another significant benefit of arbitration over litigation is
the ability to select arbitrators with expertise and specialized
knowledge.137 By choosing arbitrators with knowledge in the
area of the dispute, the parties can save time and money because
they do not have to educate the decisionmaker.138 In fact,
depending on the arbitration agreement, the parties may be able
to choose an arbitrator who is familiar with the facts of the case
before the arbitration begins.139
This may be particularly
effective in small quality of life disputes where the money
involved is miniscule, but the emotional climate between the
parties is very heated. By using an arbitrator who is already
familiar with the dispute, the parties can avoid unnecessary
expense in educating the arbitrator about the nuances of the
case. Despite the benefits of selecting an arbitrator who is
already familiar with the case, selecting an arbitrator who knows
one or both parties beforehand may ultimately increase
animosity between the parties, because the losing party may
believe the outcome was biased and not based on the merits.
Parties may also get a greater sense of justice when a
dispute is decided by an expert rather than a judge or jury. A
party may view the judge and jury members as laypeople who do
not completely understand the issues. On the other hand, there
is still the potential that residents will view the process as “fixed”
if an arbitrator’s professional background makes the arbitrator
appear more sympathetic to the board or another neighbor. For
example, in a dispute over whether a certain activity is allowed
under the common interest development’s restrictions, if the
arbitrator has a background in real estate law, the resident may
view the arbitration award as one made by an “insider,” whose
natural tendency is to rule in favor of the board.
Another benefit of using arbitration over litigation is that,
generally, there is no right to appeal an arbitrator’s decision.
When parties agree that arbitration will be binding, arbitration
reduces cost by severely limiting the right of appeal.140 A binding
arbitration award can only be overturned if it “ ‘was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means,’ or . . . the arbitrator
displayed various forms of misconduct including ‘exceeding their
137
138
139
140

See 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 7:43, at 172.
See Librett, supra note 51.
Siegler, supra note 43.
1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 82, § 43.05[5][a].
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powers,’ ‘refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
shown,’ or ‘refusing to hear evidence material to the
controversy.’ ”141 The grounds for overturning an arbitration
award on appeal have been described as “extremely limited” and
“arbitration awards are seldom challenged and very rarely
overturned.”142
In some instances, the finality of binding
arbitration can also stimulate settlement between the parties
because one party may be less willing to take a chance with an
arbitrator whose decision cannot be challenged.143 Generally,
however, arbitrations are settled much less frequently than
litigation.144 A limited right of appeal can be desirable in
common interest development disputes because it creates speedy
and certain results while preventing smaller value disputes from
blossoming into costly litigation that engenders permanent
animosity between the parties.
A final advantage of arbitration is that it allows for more
flexible results than litigation. As discussed above, courts are
very limited in the relief that they can grant. In arbitration, on
the other hand, an arbitrator has much more leeway in crafting
the relief.145 The federal standard for arbitration is that the
“remedy must ‘draw its essence’ from the underlying agreement
that authorizes the arbitration.”146 Also, “[a]rbitrators have the
power to render such relief as is appropriate to the dispute
submitted to them as long as the relief does not offend public
policy or require a result contrary to statute.”147 Therefore, as
long as arbitrators do not stray too far from the wording of the
arbitration agreement and applicable law, they can reach
solutions that are more equitable than those available in court.

141
Alvin I. Apfelberg, Laying Down the Law: Mediation-Arbitration v. Litigation,
COOPERATOR: THE CO-OP & CONDO MONTHLY, June 2000, available at
http://www.cooperator.com/articles/537/1/Laying-Down-the-Law/Page1.html.
142
Goldsmith, supra note 77.
143
Id.
144
Harold D. Field, Jr. & John J. Upchurch, Preparation for and Presentation
During Alternative Dispute Resolution, in THE LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK, supra note
125, at 69, 70 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds., 2000).
145
Costello, supra note 125, at 22.
146
Id. at 33 n.1 (quoting Steel Workers v. Enter. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)).
147
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 9:30, at 213.
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Furthermore, the parties can anticipate the needs of
arbitration and shape remedies that will suit specific disputes.148
For example, the board can include an arbitration agreement in
the common interest development’s bylaws that includes specific
remedies for commonly occurring disputes, such as ones
involving noise, pets, parking, and other quality of life issues.
The parties to the dispute can either agree to the arbitration
agreement or the board may be able to force arbitration by
amending its bylaws.149 Arbitrators have a degree of flexibility
not available in litigation, and they tend to “split the baby” by
giving each side a compromised decision in an attempt to satisfy
both parties.150
Arbitration, however, lacks the degree of
flexibility available in mediation.151
Arbitration has several disadvantages.
The primary
criticism of arbitration is that it is too much like litigation. In
both arbitration and litigation, the parties present evidence to a
neutral decisionmaker who declares a winner and a loser.152 An
arbitrator, like a judge, “has to say one party is right or
wrong.”153 In fact, the role of an arbitrator is “not unlike that of a
judge”; they both perform essentially the same function.154
Arbitration is also similar to litigation because it is an
adversarial procedure where the parties concentrate on defeating
the opposing party, as opposed to searching for common ground
and compromise.155
Arbitration, like litigation, consists of
opening statements, direct and cross examination of witnesses,
and can include closing statements.156 Therefore, arbitration
retains much of the character and adversarial nature of
litigation. Furthermore, arbitration is viewed by some as just as

148

Costello, supra note 125, at 22.
Romano, supra note 39.
150
Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake
the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 588
(2007).
151
See Lent, supra note 74.
152
Pessen, supra note 107.
153
Lent, supra note 74 (quoting Eric Tuchmann, General Counsel for the
American Arbitration Association) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154
Goldsmith, supra note 77.
155
Id.
156
Mark A. Drummond, Advice for Your First Arbitration, 32 LITIG. NEWS 7, 7
(2007).
149
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expensive and time consuming as litigation, and over the past
twenty to thirty years, arbitration has “bloomed into another
form of litigation.”157
Also, arbitration is generally “binding on the parties
regardless of whether either side agrees with the decision of the
arbitrator.”158 These types of decisions led to the saying “a good
compromise is one that leaves both sides equally unhappy.” This
may discourage one or both parties from using arbitration in the
future and thus result in costly lawsuits because both feel they at
least have an opportunity to achieve their desired result in
litigation. There is also “the perception that arbitrators ignore
the law and tend to apply ‘rough justice’ ” that leads to a “cut-thebaby” approach, which infuriates a party who feels he has done
nothing wrong.159
Depending on the circumstances of the
dispute, a compromised award can be either a positive or
negative outcome.
Another potential weakness of arbitration is that in certain
circumstances, one of the parties may desire publicity and want
to create precedent.160 If the parties are subject to binding
arbitration, these goals are not well served. For example, if a
resident believes that his co-op board refused to approve the sale
of a unit because the potential buyer was a minority, the resident
may very well want to expose the board to negative publicity and
create binding precedent that would prevent other boards from
acting in a similar manner. Privacy is generally a positive
attribute of arbitration, but it can have negative implications in
individual cases where the threat of bad publicity can be used as
a bargaining tool to change board policy or common interest
development bylaws and restrictions.
Finally, many of the positive attributes of arbitration
disappear when arbitration is nonbinding. If arbitration is
nonbinding, there may be diminished incentive for parties to
compromise because they can still go to court afterwards if they

157
Lent, supra note 74 (quoting Simeon Baum, President of Resolve Mediation
Services, Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158
Romano, supra note 106.
159
Kenneth Gumbiner, An Overview of Alternative Dispute Resolution, in THE
LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 1, 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT, supra note 87.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 997 (2010)

932

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:907

do not like the outcome of the arbitration.161 Nonbinding
arbitration also prematurely exposes a party’s trial strategy
when presenting the case to an arbitrator. A party may
intentionally present a weak case to the arbitrator in order to see
the other side’s case, knowing that the results are not binding.
When mandatory, nonbinding arbitration can be just another
added cost and delay in getting a final resolution to a dispute.
On the other hand, nonbinding arbitration provides the
parties with an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker
evaluate their respective cases, which may provide a sobering
reminder of the realistic strengths and weaknesses of a party’s
case.
Furthermore, nonbinding arbitration is more like
mediation than litigation because the parties shape their own
settlements rather than having one imposed upon them by the
courts.162
Arbitration has many significant advantages over litigation,
but it still retains some of litigation’s weaknesses. Despite
arbitration’s limitations, it can be a powerful tool for common
interest development boards to provide legal costs and provide
residents a fast and economical solution to their disputes.
C.

Use of Mediation in Condo and Co-op Disputes

Mediation is another effective method for resolving condo
and co-op disputes. Mediation is where parties to a dispute meet
with a neutral third party to facilitate a settlement. The aim of
mediation is to reach a jointly acceptable compromise between
the parties. Mediation differs from litigation and arbitration in
that a mediator does not make any decision regarding the merits
of the parties’ claims.163 A mediator cannot impose a settlement
Mediators aid
and does not make a binding ruling.164
negotiations by defining the issues, removing impediments to
communication, and investigating possible means of resolving
the dispute.165 Mediators accomplish these goals by providing a
framework within which the parties negotiate. They help control

161
See Apfelberg, supra note 141 (noting that nonbinding arbitration preserves
the right to sue); see also 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 22:51, at 568.
162
Gumbiner, supra note 159.
163
See id. at 6.
164
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 2:16, at 27.
165
Id.
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the agenda of the negotiations, clarify misunderstandings
between the parties, make suggestions for mutually satisfactory
resolutions, and ensure fairness in the process.166
Mediation has several advantages over litigation and
arbitration. The most significant advantage of mediation is the
parties’ ability to shape relief that is individually tailored for
their dispute. Mediation leaves the parties in control of the
settlement process, rather than ceding the result to a judge, jury,
or arbitrator.167 In litigation and arbitration, the relief that can
be provided is limited by substantive law.168 Additionally,
arbitrators are also limited by the terms of the arbitration
agreement.169
Mediators, on the other hand, may suggest
creative and innovative solutions to help the parties resolve their
conflict.170
For example, mediators are not constrained to
recommending monetary relief. This flexibility is particularly
helpful in quality of life disputes that arise in common interest
developments.171
Bruce A. Cholst, a Manhattan co-op lawyer, provides an
excellent example of the virtues of mediation for quality of life
issues in condo and co-op disputes.172 In his scenario, an upstairs
neighbor has young children that play on hardwood floors, and
the noise disturbs the downstairs neighbor.173 The upstairs
neighbors have not violated the condo or co-op restrictions,
however, because their apartment has the required eighty
percent carpeting—although not on the areas the children are
playing.174 While a judge or arbitrator may be powerless to
address this problem because the upstairs neighbors are
technically in compliance with the rules, a mediator could
persuade the upstairs neighbor to add more carpeting, have the
children play on the existing carpeting, or move the existing
166
BENNETT G. PICKER, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR
RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES § 1.3, at 3–4 (2d ed. 2003).
167
William Struyk, Mediation (Autumn 2007), http://www.cnyc.org/code/archive/
legal/archive-mediation-A07.htm.
168
2 ROHAN & RUSKIN, supra note 79, § 11.10.
169
Romano, supra note 106; see also 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:3, at 63
(noting that arbitrators cannot take the same “initiatives” as mediators when
resolving disputes).
170
See Romano, supra note 106.
171
See Pessen, supra note 107.
172
See Romano, supra note 106.
173
Id.
174
See id.
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carpeting to where the children play.175 Mediators can bypass
dogmatic adherence to the rules and help reach a compromise
that best serves the parties’ needs. Courts and arbitrators lack
the ability to facilitate the same kind of meaningful settlement
that a mediator can provide. However, it is the parties who have
the responsibility of reaching an acceptable compromise; a
mediator is merely a catalyst for helping them to reach that
point.176
Mediation also offers flexibility in the process used to resolve
a dispute because “the parties ‘own’ the process.”177 The parties
decide the logistics and rules, and the mediator guides
settlement discussions and facilitates communication. Attorneys
representing the parties may be present, but they are not
necessary.178 Also, the parties are free to choose what level of
presentation of evidence and discovery is appropriate.179
Typically, mediation does not feature discovery, but the parties
can agree to exchange documents when appropriate.180
Additionally, parties do not usually present evidence but can use
it to educate the mediator about the details of the dispute.181
Furthermore, the parties can set both when and where mediation
is to take place. These relaxed rules in dealing with evidence,
procedure, and discovery allow parties to explain their position in
a manner that is not available in a courtroom.182 Mediators do
not judge the merits of disputes; rather, their job is to help the
parties reach an agreement. While mediators lack formal
decisionmaking authority, they are able to “exert power by
affecting parties’ perceptions of a dispute, setting the agenda,
exploring possible outcomes, and drafting the precise wording of
an agreement.”183

175

See id.
See Krivis, supra note 78.
177
Mollen, supra note 3, at 96.
178
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 509.
179
Id.
180
W. Reece Bader et al., How To Get to Alternative Dispute Resolution, in THE
LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 35, 50 (document exchange may be
necessary in determining damages or educating the mediator about the nuances of
the dispute).
181
Id. at 51.
182
See Romano, supra note 73.
183
Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology’s Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm
for Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 261–62 (2006).
176

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 997 (2010)

2010]

THE BENEFITS OF ADR

935

Mediation also provides both confidentiality and privacy. It
is private because it is not open to the public or the media; only
the parties may attend. Similarly, it is confidential because the
parties cannot disclose the mediation’s settlement negotiations.184
A mediator is also generally obligated to maintain both privacy
and confidentiality.185 Confidentiality in mediation may be
covered by state or federal law.186 Furthermore, Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 limits the admissibility of mediation proceedings.187
However, the parties should enter into a confidentiality
agreement to ensure that statements made during the course of
the mediation will remain confidential and will be inadmissible
Confidentiality agreements also eliminate any
in court.188
ambiguity in interpreting statutory and case law.189 As in
arbitration, confidentiality during mediation allows the parties to
fully express their grievances without the fear of publicizing
private or embarrassing information. Confidentiality enables the
parties to express themselves in a candid manner without
appearing weak to third parties and the public.190 Often, the
publicity related to a condo or co-op dispute can have a more
negative impact than the underlying dispute itself.191
Confidentiality allows parties to fully vent their frustrations and
anger, resulting in a cathartic effect that helps the sides reach a
compromise.192 Without confidentiality, the parties will not fully
participate in negotiations and mediation would be rendered
ineffective.
Mediation also preserves the relationship of the parties to a
dispute.
This is especially important in common interest
developments because residents and board members will have

184

1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:10.
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT, supra note 87.
186
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:13; see also GOLANN & FOLBERG, supra note
119, at 350.
187
FED. R. EVID. 408; see also 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:11.
188
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:11.
189
Id. § 4:15.
190
Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 37–38 (1986).
191
PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.5, at 23. An example of negative publicity having
a greater impact than the dispute itself is when the negative attention of a
particularly bitter lawsuit drives down the desirability and value of the condo or coop development as a whole.
192
See Krivis, supra note 78.
185
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some level of interaction after a dispute is resolved, regardless of
the outcome.193 The nature of mediation diminishes enmity and
hatred by helping parties find common ground and forge an
agreement, rather than relying on a third party decisionmaker.194
Mediation helps repair relationships by giving the parties an
opportunity and forum to address one another face-to-face.
Even if a settlement is not reached through mediation, the
parties may lose their hostility toward one another and preserve
their future relationship.195 Mediation allows the parties to reach
a “win-win” solution that takes into account the parties’ future
relationship.196 By opening dialogue between the two sides,
meditation can also prepare the parties to craft pragmatic
solutions that give both sides what they want, or at least a
solution they are willing to accept.197 In contrast, when parties
go straight to litigation or arbitration, they are often forced into a
posture where they are unwilling to compromise and one of them
is nearly certain to be unhappy with the result.
A related benefit of mediation over litigation and arbitration
is that it allows for more effective communication between the
parties. The goal of mediation is to facilitate the parties’ ability
to comprehend the interests of both sides, instead of
concentrating solely on defending one position.198
The
opportunity to present one’s case and to understand one’s
opponent helps bring about compromise.199 Mediation allows
parties to communicate to find mutually acceptable solutions,
rather than “postur[ing] heavily in hopes of ‘winning.’ ”200
Parties’ satisfaction with mediation “derives from the
opportunity to participate actively in the process, voice one’s side
of the case, and feel that others have listened and understood
193

See Elisha & Wiltgen, supra note 9, at 15.
See Siegler, supra note 43.
195
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 96.
196
Bader et al., supra note 180, at 42.
197
See Julie Marcus, Mediation: Making Peace in the Eye of the Storm (Spring
1997), http://www.cnyc.org/code/newsletters/1997/1997-spr-mediation.htm.
198
SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 3:2, at 3-5 (2d
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2007).
199
Lent, supra note 74 (quoting Simeon Baum, President of Resolve Mediation
Services, Inc., who asserts that “[m]ediation focuses on quality of communication.
When you feel you’ve been heard and you understand someone, you’re going to get
along better.”).
200
MEDIATE (DON’T LITIGATE) YOUR CO-OP/CONDO RESIDENTIAL DISPUTE, supra
note 80.
194
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one’s viewpoint.”201 Mediation is personal in nature and helps
the parties “develop a sense of investment” in its outcome, which
enables them to be more open minded when listening to their
opponent.202 Additionally, the personal contact of mediation
improves communication and facilitates the process.203
Furthermore, because the parties in common interest disputes
fully understand the problem, and because these disputes
generally involve low dollar amounts, enabling direct
communication is particularly important.204
Common interest disputes are often based on “emotional
issues rather than practical ones” and relatively insignificant
disputes can quickly escalate.205 Mediation reduces emotional
barriers to communication that prohibit compromise.206 Again,
mediation presents a forum that allows parties to purge their
frustration and reach productive solutions by allowing them to
openly express their feelings and discuss legally extraneous
matters.207
Even if the parties are not communicating directly at first,
the mediator can facilitate a dialogue by meeting with them
individually to fully understand their respective positions. These
private meetings, known as caucuses, familiarize mediators with
Because these meetings are
the details of the dispute.208
confidential, parties can be completely forthright with the
mediator, who enables them to objectively assess their
positions.209
However, these private meetings can be
counterproductive if the parties are working towards an
agreement on their own and should only be used when they reach
an impasse.210
201

COLE ET AL., supra note 198, § 4:4, at 4-24.
PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.5, at 22.
203
Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 183, at 255 (asserting that the “in-person”
nature of ADR is crucial because it “allows for rich communication that includes
body language, tone of voice, and silence”).
204
See DeDino, supra note 67, at 895.
205
Romano, supra note 39 (quoting Bejamin F. Sands, a New York mediator)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
206
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:2, at 62.
207
COLE ET AL., supra note 198, § 4:4, at 4-23 to -25.
208
Gumbiner, supra note 159, at 6.
209
Id.; see also Lent, supra note 74 (“It is a well-known fact that parties overestimate the strength of their own case. A mediator can help give an objective view
with respect to the likely outcome of their case.” (quoting Eric Tuchmann, general
counsel for the American Arbitration Association)).
210
Gumbiner, supra note 159, at 6.
202
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Private caucuses serve many functions: they help form a
trusting relationship between the mediator and the parties, they
allow parties to vent frustrations without disrupting the joint
session and generating more hostility, and they enable the
mediator to determine the parties’ needs.211 Also, mediators can
use these sessions to clarify misunderstandings and gauge
whether the parties are truly interested in settlement.212 At the
conclusion of a caucus, a party decides what information the
mediator may share with the opposing party.213 Also, mediators
can recommend that parties disclose certain information gleaned
in a private caucus that the mediator believes will help achieve a
settlement.214
The cost of mediation is another advantage over litigation
and arbitration. Mediation can frequently be achieved at a
fraction of the expense of litigation.215 The primary way that
mediation saves the parties money is by encouraging
settlement.216 Settlement eliminates the risk of a high jury
verdict and reduces the amount of legal fees incurred by both
sides of a dispute. Also, mediation saves money by facilitating
document exchange and eliminating much of the cost associated
with discovery.217
Moreover, mediation is less costly than
litigation and arbitration because “mediation often resolves the
dispute in just one or two short sessions of 2 or 3 hours,” as
opposed to months or years.218 Quality of life disputes in common
interest developments are the type of conflicts that can be
resolved quickly through mediation because they do not involve
complex factual or legal issues. The speed of mediation reduces
attorney fees, litigation expense, and indirect costs connected
with prolonged litigation.219 Additionally, because it is not
211

1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 5:12, at 94.
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 95–96.
213
PICKER, supra note 166, § 3.2.6, at 32.
214
Id.
215
2 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 79, § 11.10.
216
See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991)
(“[L]awyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost
always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.”).
217
See Krivis, supra note 78 (noting that an advantage to mediation is a
mediator’s ability to help the parties reach an agreement on informal document
exchange).
218
Struyk, supra note 167.
219
PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.5, at 22.
212
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necessary for a party to be represented by an attorney during
mediation, the parties are able to save money, especially in small
dollar quality of life disputes that arise in condos and co-ops.220
Even an unsuccessful mediation may reduce costs “by
abbreviating the discovery phase of litigation and defining the
remaining issues.”221 Furthermore, if mediation fails to produce
a settlement, it may still ease tensions to the point that the
parties agree to arbitrate rather than litigate their dispute.222
Finally, mediation should be considered as an option in
condo and co-op disputes because of its high success rate.
Experts vary on the effectiveness of mediation, with estimates
ranging from seventy percent up to ninety percent.223 However,
even if mediation is successful only seventy percent of the time, it
is still a very powerful tool to resolve disputes as quickly,
cheaply, and painlessly as possible. Also, litigation or arbitration
is still available should the parties fail to reach a settlement
through mediation.224 Litigation can be put on hold while the
parties attempt to mediate and then be resumed if the mediation
fails.225
Despite mediation’s many positive attributes, it is not
without its disadvantages, and it is not appropriate in all
circumstances. One of the most significant limitations on
mediation is that the parties usually cannot be compelled to
participate.226 Often the most difficult step in mediation is
getting the parties to agree to mediate in the first place.227
Because mediation is normally a voluntary process, the parties
220

See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 509.
Marcus, supra note 197.
222
See, e.g., COLE ET AL., supra note 198, § 4:4, at 4-22 to -23
(“Research . . . shows that disputants typically come away well-satisfied with the
experience even when mediation fails.”).
223
See Mollen, supra note 3, at 96 (“[T]he American Arbitration Association has
reported a success rate of 75%–90% in the mediations which it conducts.”); see also
MEDIATE (DON’T LITIGATE) YOUR CO-OP/CONDO RESIDENTIAL DISPUTE, supra note
80, at 3 (“Most (70-80%) cases brought to mediation settle, and the process is quicker
and cheaper than litigation.”); Michael A. Burns, Closing Argument: Give Presuit
Mediation a Chance, 20 L.A. LAWYER 60, 60 (1997) (“Where presuit mediation has
been tried, the success rate has exceeded 70 percent.”); Struyk, supra note 166
(“[M]ediation has about a 70–80% success rate.”).
224
Mollen, supra note 3, at 96.
225
Struyk, supra note 167.
226
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:2, at 62.
227
Romano, supra note 79 (quoting Benjamin Sands, a professional mediator in
New York).
221
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must be open to the idea of reaching a compromise.
A
recalcitrant party has the ability to render mediation ineffective
from its outset.
A related disadvantage to mediation is that both parties’
desire to settle is necessary for it to succeed.228 If either party
absolutely refuses to settle, mediation becomes just another
impediment to achieving a final result—either through litigation
or arbitration. Furthermore, if the parties have acted in bad
faith before attempting to mediate a dispute, the damage to their
credibility may be an insurmountable obstacle in reaching a
settlement.229
Another significant weakness of mediation is that its success
or failure is heavily dependent on the skill of the individual
mediator.230 Selection of an experienced mediator with “hands on
experience solving problems” has been described as “pivotal” to
the success of mediation.231 Parties to a common interest dispute
should carefully consider their choice of mediator and ensure
that he has the proper background, credentials, and experience.
Regrettably, a large number of individuals offering mediation
services are ineffective or, worse, they contribute to a mediation’s
failure.232 In particular, inexperienced or unqualified mediators
can irreparably damage settlement negotiations by favoring one
party over another.233 Unfortunately, there are no uniform
standards for mediators’ education, training, or practice.234
Mediation also has several other disadvantages. First,
mediation may be used as a form of informal discovery by a party
who is looking to save costs and has no intention of settling.235
Yet, this is not a significant concern in condo and co-op disputes,
especially quality of life disputes, because the need for discovery
for noise complaints or parking issues is not great. Second,
mediation, like arbitration, is inappropriate in cases where either

228

1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:2, at 62.
See PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.2.3, at 18 (listing “existence of bad faith in
prior negotiations” among the factors weighing against mediation).
230
1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:2, at 62.
231
Krivis, supra note 78.
232
Gumbiner, supra note 159, at 8.
233
Id.
234
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT, supra note 87.
235
Gumbiner, supra note 159, at 8.
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of the parties wants to set legal precedent.236 Common interest
boards may desire a court victory to vindicate their rights and
prevent other residents from violating restrictions. On the other
hand, a condo or co-op resident may want a court to void a
restriction that is inconsistent with the law. Finally, settlements
reached in mediation are unenforceable until the parties enter
into a binding contract.237 However, it is rare for mediated
settlements to collapse after mediation is complete.238
Mediation offers parties to a condo or co-op dispute a cost
effective and flexible remedy to conflicts that may otherwise
spiral out of proportion. In spite of mediation’s short comings, it
offers an economical alternative to litigation and arbitration that
helps preserve the parties’ relationship. Condo and co-op boards
should strongly consider adding a mediation provision to their
bylaws or proprietary leases.
IV. MANDATORY ADR IN CONDO AND CO-OP DISPUTES
A.

The Advantages of Mandatory ADR

Mandatory ADR requires parties to a dispute to attempt
mediation or submit to nonbinding arbitration. Mandatory ADR
offers a variety of benefits to both residents and boards in
common interest development disputes. First, mandatory ADR
eases overcrowding of court dockets because the vast majority of
cases settle.239 Second, mandatory ADR discourages frivolous
claims from the outset by exposing flaws in marginal claims and
adding an additional layer of time and expense to all claims.
Mandatory ADR levels the playing field for residents
involved in condo and co-op disputes by removing personal
economics from the equation. Residents in common interest
developments are often at a significant disadvantage when
litigating against the board because the board is better able to
bear the costs of a lawsuit.240 Mandatory ADR prevents the
board from using litigation as a first resort in an effort to
discourage residents from pursuing meritorious claims. Also, in
236

PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.2.3, at 18; see also Field et al., supra note 144, at

237

1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:30, at 78.
Goldsmith, supra note 77.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255(3)(b) (West 2010).
See id. § 718.1255(3)(a).

76.
238
239
240
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disputes between two neighbors, there may be a large disparity
in the each party’s personal resources. ADR provides cost
effective methods of achieving relief, especially in quality of life
disputes.241
Another benefit of mandatory ADR is that it forces boards to
participate in negotiations and helps prevent costly and
acrimonious litigation. Many boards do not want to relinquish
their ability to sue for fear of losing a perceived advantage they
have in litigation.242 This advantage may vary based on the
jurisdiction. For example, Florida courts apply a reasonableness
standard when reviewing board actions, which prohibits the
board from adopting “arbitrary or capricious rules bearing no
relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the
various unit owners.”243 A resident challenging board action in a
jurisdiction that applies a reasonableness standard must show
that the board acted unreasonably. On the other hand, New
York courts apply a business judgment rule standard when
reviewing board actions.244 Under this standard, a board’s
actions made in “good faith,” using “honest judgment,” and in
“legitimate furtherance of [the common interest development’s]
purposes” are immune from judicial review.245
Residents
contesting board action under a business judgment rule standard
must show that the board breached its fiduciary duty “in the
form of bad faith, acts outside the board’s authority or
discriminatory acts.”246 Regardless of the standard applied by a
particular court, board action enjoys a presumption of validity,
and it is very difficult for residents to have a board’s decision
overturned in court.247 Because of the deference courts give to
boards’ actions, boards are reluctant to give up their advantage

241

Id. § 718.1255(3)(d).
Librett, supra note 51 (“Despite the distinct advantages of arbitration and
mediation over costly litigation, many boards are reluctant to give up their power to
sue, especially in cases involving themselves, because they feel they may have more
leverage during litigation.”).
243
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
244
See Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 533, 553
N.E.2d 1317, 1319, 554 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (1990).
245
See id. at 538, 553 N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
246
Mollen, supra note 3, at 83–84 (quoting Richard Siegler, The Aftermath of
Levandusky, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1994, at 3).
247
Id. at 85.
242
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by considering arbitration or mediation. If ADR is ineffective,
the board would retain its favorable position in a subsequent
lawsuit.
Another reason to require ADR in common interest disputes
is that many parties and their attorneys are hesitant to propose
mediation because they fear it will be “interpreted as a sign of
weakness.”248 If ADR is mandatory, the parties can avoid
posturing and focus on reaching a settlement. Getting the
parties to agree to mediation in the first place is the “hardest
part.”249 By making ADR compulsory, this initial obstacle is
removed, and many more disputes can be settled in an efficient
manner. Furthermore, parties are often afraid “they will be
forced to compromise” once mediation has begun.250 However,
mandatory ADR will force the parties to sit down and learn that
a settlement cannot be imposed upon them.
The cost of instituting mediation or nonbinding arbitration
may also discourage a party from considering ADR.251 Parties
may be reluctant to incur additional attorney fees involved in
attending and preparing for mediation or nonbinding
arbitration.252 Furthermore, ADR entails the time and expense
associated with traveling back and forth to mediation sessions
and missing time from work.253 However, these expenses can be
trivial compared to the potential cost savings associated with
successful ADR. Mandatory ADR forces the parties to adopt a
more constructive view of solving the dispute, rather than
focusing on short term expenses. Substantive and procedural
safeguards can minimize the unnecessary cost of mediation or
nonbinding arbitration by setting limits on the time and expense
of mediation.254 Residents also benefit from the lower cost of
“invoking a neutral resolution process” in compulsory ADR
because the procedures and infrastructure are well established.255

248

PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.7.
Romano, supra note 79 (quoting Benjamin Sands, a professional mediator in
New York).
250
Id.
251
See 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:4, at 63.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra
note 46, at 700.
249
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Finally, mandatory ADR alleviates problems caused by the
use of unqualified mediators. States that require ADR have
instituted education, training, and qualification standards for
mediators.256 Establishing official guidelines for mandatory ADR
ensures that “[e]xpert neutral personnel can effectively evaluate
the resolution mechanism that appears most appropriate for the
particular dispute, and assist in resolution of the dispute.”257
Mandatory ADR provides the framework to implement formal
training, education, and certification of mediators and
arbitrators, which promotes solutions to condo and co-op
disputes. State action is needed because many boards are simply
unaware of ADR’s benefits or refuse to use ADR.258
B.

States That Have Adopted Mandatory ADR in Condo and
Co-op Disputes

Several state and local governments have enacted statutes
requiring mandatory ADR.259 The use of mandatory ADR is
varied in application, and each state has taken a slightly
different approach. Each of the following states provides an
example of how mandatory ADR can be implemented.
1.

Florida

Florida mandates ADR for condominium260 and co-op261
disputes, with certain exceptions.262 The Florida statutes govern

256
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255(4) (West 2010) (noting that Florida employs
arbitrators and regulates outside arbitrators); id. at § 718.1255(4)(f) (noting that
mediators must be certified); see also Apfelberg, supra note 141 (discussing Nevada’s
requirement that mediator-arbitrators have at least five years experience).
257
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS: TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION 10 (2002),
available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/TR-CID-ADR.pdf.
258
See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 509 n.44 (noting that mediation clauses have
only recently become standard in co-op leases).
259
In addition to the states and statutes discussed below, see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:8B-14(k) (West 2010) (New Jersey law requiring common interest developments
to provide an alternative to litigation); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1345(b) (West 2010)
(California law requiring a party, in limited circumstances, to “endeavor” to submit
disputes to ADR before bring a lawsuit); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, § 28.2(b) (2010) (New
York administrative rule requiring disputes less than $6,000—or $10,000 in New
York City Civil Court—that are not in small claims part to be submitted to
arbitration); MONTGOMERY CNTY. (MD.) CODE ch. 10B (2010) (requiring mandatory
ADR once disputes have been submitted to the commission).
260
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255.
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disputes involving a board’s actions, or failure to act, based on its
bylaws or applicable law and certain board election and meeting
requirements.263 A party to a condo or co-op dispute must submit
a petition for nonbinding arbitration before it can file a
lawsuit.264 Filing for arbitration tolls the statute of limitations.265
Once a petition has been filed, any party can request that the
dispute be referred to mediation.266 Mediation is commenced
either by agreement of the parties or a referral by the
arbitrator.267 The parties then select a mediator or, if they
cannot agree, one is appointed by the arbitrator.268 Parties must
attend the mediation or risk sanctions.269 Also, the parties will
split the cost of mediation, “unless they agree otherwise.”270
Once mediation is commenced, the process is confidential;
the arbitrator cannot consider the mediation proceedings should
they fail.271 Furthermore, if the mediator declares an impasse,
the parties can agree to arbitration, either nonbinding or
binding, or terminate arbitration and proceed to litigation.272 If
the parties agree to nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator’s
decision is admissible in court if the parties later litigate.273 A
nonbinding decision will become enforceable by the parties if
neither party files a lawsuit within thirty days.274 If, however, a
party commences a lawsuit and fails to obtain a judgment that is
“not more favorable than the arbitration decision,” then that
party is liable for the other party’s arbitration fees—including
attorney’s fees—and expenses.275

261
Id. § 719.1255 (applying the language of section 718.1255 of the Florida Code
to co-op disputes).
262
See id. § 718.1255(1).
263
Id. § 718.1255(1)(a)–(b).
264
Id. § 718.1255(4)(a); see also id. § 718.1255(4)(b) (detailing the requirements
for the petition).
265
Id. § 718.1255(4)(i).
266
Id. § 718.1255(4)(e).
267
Id.
268
Id. § 718.1255(4)(f).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id. § 718.1255(4)(h).
272
Id.
273
Id. § 718.1255(4).
274
Id. § 718.1255(4)(k).
275
Id. § 718.1255(4)(l).
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Nevada

Nevada also requires parties to a condo or co-op dispute to
resort to ADR prior to instituting a lawsuit.276 Nevada created
an Ombudsman position to explain to the parties their rights, to
process claims submitted to arbitration, and to perform a variety
of administrative functions.277 The Ombudsman also attempts to
mediate the dispute before it is referred to formal meditation or
arbitration.278 If the Ombudsman cannot help the parties reach a
settlement, the case is referred to a certified mediatorarbitrator.279 Commencing arbitration or mediation tolls any
applicable statute of limitations.280 The parties are free to choose
mediation, nonbinding arbitration, or arbitration,281 but, if they
cannot agree on the form of ADR, nonbinding arbitration will be
used to settle the dispute.282 The party instituting ADR must
serve an opponent with the claim and an explanation of Nevada’s
mediation and arbitration procedures in condo and co-op
disputes.283 An arbitrator is either chosen by the parties from
three names supplied by the Ombudsman or, if the parties
cannot agree, the Ombudsman appoints one.284 If the parties fail
to reach an acceptable resolution through mediation or
nonbinding arbitration, they are free to file a lawsuit.

276
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.310(1) (West 2010). But see id. § 38.300(3)
(excluding a civil action for an injunction and one relating to title of residential
property from mandatory alternative dispute resolution).
277
See id. § 116.625.
278
Apfelberg, supra note 141.
279
Id. (explaining that arbitrators are either agreed upon by the parties or
appointed by the Ombudsman and that arbitrators must have at least five years of
arbitration experience); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.340(1) (requiring the
Real Estate Division of the Department of Business and Industry to provide a list of
available mediators and arbitrators).
280
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.350.
281
Id. § 38.320(1)(c).
282
See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 38.350(5)–(6).
283
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.320(3); see also id. § 38.340(2) (requiring the Real
Estate Division of the Department of Business and Industry to establish and
maintain a “document . . . contain[ing] a written explanation of the procedures for
mediating and arbitrating claims”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 38.350(1) (requiring service
of “written claim and the statement explaining the procedures for mediation and
arbitration on the opposing party within 45 days after filing the claim”).
284
Apfelberg, supra note 141.
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Hawaii

Hawaii’s approach to mandatory ADR is slightly different
than other states that require ADR in condo and co-op disputes.
Hawaii does not require ADR as a prerequisite for filing a
lawsuit. However, once either party to a condo dispute requests
mediation285 or arbitration,286 the other party must participate.287
If the other party refuses to participate in mediation, a court can
consider the refusal when awarding costs and fees, including
attorney’s fees.288 However, the parties normally pay their own
costs associated with mediation.289
Once mediation is
commenced, the parties are required to participate for two
months, but they may agree to continue beyond that.290
In arbitration, the parties are not bound by the rules of
evidence, except those relating to privileged communications, and
the arbitrator has the ability to restrict the scope of discovery if it
causes excessive delays or cost.291 Also, the arbitrator has the
sole discretion to award fees in the arbitration.292 An arbitrator
must always provide an award in writing293 and, if requested by a
party, provide findings of fact and conclusions of law.294 If either
party is not satisfied with the result of arbitration, they must file
a lawsuit “within ten days after service of the arbitration
award.”295 The arbitration award is inadmissible at trial.296 If,
however, the party demanding a trial “does not prevail at trial,”
that party is liable for the “costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees of
the trial.”297

285

See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514B-161 (West 2010).
See id. § 514B-162.
287
See id. §§ 514B-161(a), -162(a). But see id. § 514B-161(b) (listing certain
disputes that are not subject to mandatory mediation); id. § 514B-162(b) (listing
certain disputes that are not subject to mandatory arbitration); see also id. § 514B162(c) (setting forth the procedure for disputing the applicability of mandatory
arbitration).
288
Id. § 514B-161(a).
289
Id.
290
Id. § 514B-161(c).
291
Id. § 514B-162(a).
292
Id. § 514B-162(e).
293
Id. § 514B-162(f).
294
Id. § 514B-162(g).
295
Id. § 514B-163(b).
296
See id. § 514B-163(c).
297
Id. § 514B-163(d).
286
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CONCLUSION

Condo and co-op ownership has exploded in recent years and
will likely continue to increase in the future. To avoid costly
litigation that has accompanied the boom in common interest
developments, boards should require ADR for certain disputes.
Although alternative dispute resolution is not appropriate for
every type of dispute, it offers a quick, cheap, and private way to
resolve differences.
Furthermore, a board can tailor an
arbitration or mediation clause however they see fit. For
example, ADR could be limited to disputes under a certain dollar
amount or certain causes of action could be excluded from ADR.
However, mediation should be required in every dispute because
it will force parties to come to the bargaining table and facilitate
settlements. By requiring parties to mediate, far more cases will
be resolved at the beginning stages before high costs are incurred
and parties become entrenched in their positions. Parties who
refuse to settle in mediation will incur slightly higher costs than
if they had proceeded directly to litigation. However, the benefit
of quickly settling a larger amount of cases justifies subjecting
recalcitrant parties to the added expense. Additionally, boards
should use a combination of mediation and arbitration for certain
disputes; if mediation fails, the parties will then have to arbitrate
their dispute.
Because common interest development boards are hesitant
to adopt ADR and cede their advantage in litigation, state
legislatures should enact laws requiring ADR. There are a
variety of legislative approaches to mandatory ADR in condos
and co-ops, and legislators are free to choose a scheme that best
serves the public. These laws can be tailored to cover disputes
that should be arbitrated, while allowing other disputes to
proceed directly to court. By requiring parties to use ADR,
legislatures will prevent one side from appearing weak if he
suggests that a dispute be mediated or arbitrated. Additionally,
mandatory ADR will help ease congested court dockets and
ultimately save both the parties and the state money.

